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Jump-diffusion modeling in emission markets
K. Borovkov1, G. Decrouez1 and J. Hinz2
Abstract
Mandatory emission trading schemes are being established around the world.
Participants of such market schemes are always exposed to risks. This leads
to the creation of an accompanying market for emission-linked derivatives. To
evaluate the fair prices of such financial products, one needs appropriate models
for the evolution of the underlying assets, emission allowance certificates. In this
paper, we discuss continuous time diffusion and jump-diffusion models, the latter
enabling one to model information shocks that cause jumps in allowance prices.
We show that the resulting martingale dynamics can be described in terms of
non-linear partial differential and integro-differential equations and use a finite
difference method to investigate numerical properties of their discretizations.
The results are illustrated by a small numerical study.
Keywords: stochastic modeling for emission trading, environmental finance, risk-
neutral pricing, market equilibrium, jump-diffusion models.
ASM Subject Classifications: Primary: 91B70; Secondary: 91B60, 91B76, 93E20.
1 Introduction
Emission Trading Schemes (ETSs) have recently been designed with the main aim to
reduce emissions of greenhouse gases and other pollutants. Two examples of ETSs are
the EU ETS (European Union Emission Trading Scheme) and the US Sulfur Dioxide
Trading System. In such schemes, the regulator allocates each market participant a
number of credits, each of which gives the holder the right to emit a specified amount
of pollutant (e.g. CO2). At the end of a compliance period, each agent should not
have released more pollutant than covered by the credits it holds at that time, or it
will have to pay a fine proportional to the excess of the pollutant amount over the one
corresponding to the credits held. During the compliance period, however, each agent
can trade credits with other market participants, depending on whether it is cheaper
to reduce emission or to buy credits.
The present study relies on a detailed mathematical model for such a scheme based
on market equilibrium. We exploit its implications for the risk neutral allowance price
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2evolution. The key issue is a feedback relationship between allowance prices and pol-
lution abatement activity. Namely, any increase in allowance price enforces emission
reduction since agents would then tend to sell their allowances. Hence the increase of
the allowance price encourages supply of certificates and lowers the probability of non-
compliance, which, in its turn, tends to diminish allowance prices. Following [15], we
describe this feedback relationship in terms of market fundamentals, using a stylized
evolution of the expected non-compliance and emission savings costs. We pay partic-
ular attention to discontinuities in the information flow, assuming that some events
may cause market participants to change their views on the future reduction volumes
required to reach compliance. We show how risk neutral allowance price reacts to such
“information discontinuity” and study this effect in derivatives valuation.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we extend the discrete-time frame-
work from [15] to the continuous-time setting. In Section 3, we interpret our results
in the context of diffusion processes, derive the corresponding partial differential equa-
tions and discuss option pricing. Section 4 is devoted to modeling shock events in the
information flow. Our description is based on jump-diffusion processes and requires
solving a nonlinear partial integro-differential equation. We show that solutions to
these non-linear equations from Section 3 and 4 satisfy the maximum principle. In
the last section we propose a numerical implementation of its solution. In particular,
we prove that the discretized problem possesses a unique solution and satisfies the
maximum principle.
The suggested allowance price model is suitable for option pricing. It turns out
that the fair price dynamics of European options written on emission allowance prices
can be obtained by solving a linear partial integro-differential equation. We illustrate
our results by numerical examples.
The literature on this subject is rather extensive, and we refer the interested reader
to a nice expository work [27] which reviews the fundamental concepts of the environ-
mental economics and provides a valuable guide to publications, which, however, is
far from being complete. The economic theory of allowance trading goes back to [12]
and [21], where the authors proposed trading the public good environment by means
of transferable permits. Important results in dynamic allowance trading were obtained
in [11], [28], [23], [19], [24], [26], [20] and in the literature cited therein. Recently, after
the introduction of the real-world emission market EU ETS, the empirical evidence
has become available. The experience gained from the operation of Phase I of the EU
ETS is discussed in [13], and a detailed analysis of spot and futures allowance prices
from this market is given in [29] and [30]. The contributions [2] and [22] are devoted to
econometric modeling of emission allowance prices. Beyond confirming stylized facts of
financial time series for prices of emission allowances, Markov switch and AR-GARCH
models are suggested. The modeling of dynamic price equilibrium is addressed in [4]
and [5], which provide a mathematical analysis of the market equilibrium and use opti-
mal stochastic control theory to show social optimality of emission trading schemes. A
3recent work [15] considers equilibrium of risk averse market players and elaborates on
risk neutral dynamics. The problems of derivatives valuation in emission markets are
also addressed. The paper [8] discusses an endogenous emission permit price dynam-
ics within equilibrium setting and elaborates on the valuation of European options on
emission allowances. The dissertation [31] and the paper [25] deal with the risk-neutral
allowance price formation within the EU ETS. In that paper, when utilizing equilib-
rium properties, the price evolution is treated in terms of marginal abatement costs
and optimal stochastic control. The work [7] is also devoted to option pricing within
EU ETS. The authors suppose that the drift of allowance spot prices is related to a
hidden variable, which describes the overall market position in allowance contracts, and
make use of filtering techniques to derive option price formulas which reflect specific al-
lowance banking regulations valid in the EU ETS. Finally, the recent work [6] presents
an approach where emission certificate futures are modeled in terms of a deterministic
time change applied to a certain class of interval-valued diffusion processes.
2 Modeling emission markets in discrete time
During the compliance period (typically 3–5 years), each ETS participant dynamically
adjusts its production processes (and hence its emissions) and trades emission credits
at times t = 0, 1, 2, . . . , T < ∞ to maximize its revenue. In this setting, allowance
price reaches its equilibrium determined by supply and demand of emission allowances.
In what follows, we base on the model from [15] which characterizes the equilibrium
allowance prices in terms of non-compliance uncertainty and abatement costs. This
characterization forms the starting point for our analysis.
Let
(
Ω,F ,P, {Ft}Tt=0
)
be a filtered probability space. We assume that all the
processes considered in this section are adapted to {Ft}Tt=0. Consider a market with
a finite set I of agents who must comply with the ETS rules. Assume that, for each
i ∈ I, an exogenously given stochastic process {Eit}T−1t=0 describes the so-called “business
as usual” emission of agent i. That is, Eit = E
i
t(ω) stands for the total pollution of
the agent i which will be emitted during the time interval (t, t + 1] if no abatement
measures are applied by the agent. Suppose that each agent i can decide, at any
time t = 0, . . . , T −1, to perform a reduction of ξit pollutant units to be emitted during
(t, t+1]. The cost of abatement is modeled by a function of the reduced volume that can
be random (reflecting the uncertainty in fuel prices). Thus, if at time t = 0, . . . , T − 1
agent i decides on reduction by x ∈ [0,∞) units for the time interval (t, t+ 1], then it
costs it C it(x) = C
i
t(x)(ω), where C
i
t : [0,∞)×Ω 7→ [0,∞) is B([0,∞))⊗Ft-measurable,
and for each ω ∈ Ω, the mapping x 7→ C it(x)(ω) is strictly convex and continuous with
Ct(0) = 0. Therefore, following this abatement policy {ξit}T−1t=0 , agent i will have born
4by the compliance date T the total abatement costs of
T−1∑
t=0
C it(ξ
i
t). (1)
For each i ∈ I, ω ∈ Ω, t = 0, . . . , T − 1 and a ∈ [0,∞), we introduce the “reduction
volume”
rit(a) = r
i
t(a)(ω) := argmax
{
ax− C it(x)(ω) : x ∈ [0, Eit(ω)]
}
. (2)
This quantity gives the “locally optimal” reduction volume for agent i for the time
period (t, t + 1] given that the price of one allowance unit is equal to a for that time
period; we may assume (and Proposition 2.1 (b) below supports this) that, being
rational, agent i will implement emission reduction at that level. As is well known (see
e.g. [15]), under the above assumptions rit(a)(ω) is a non-decreasing and continuous
function of a ∈ [0,∞) for each ω ∈ Ω and t = 0, . . . , T − 1. Next denote the total t-th
time period reduction by
rt(a) :=
∑
i∈I
rit(a), a ∈ [0,∞), (3)
which represents the total reduction by all agents in the market for the time period
(t, t+ 1], given the time t price of one allowance unit is a.
Suppose that, at any time t = 0, . . . , T , credits can be traded at the spot price At.
Denote by ϑit the change in the allowance number held by agent i at time t. Then,
given the allowance prices {At}Tt=0, the position changes {ϑit}Tt=0 will result for agent i
in the total trading costs of
T∑
t=0
ϑitAt. (4)
Here and in what follows, for simplicity’s sake we assume, zero interest rates (or,
equivalently, that all the prices are already discounted).
Further, the total pollution of agent i during the compliance interval [0, T ] can be
expressed as the cumulative business-as-usual emission less the agent’s total reduction:
T−1∑
t=0
Eit −
T−1∑
t=0
ξit.
Denoting by γi the agent’s initial allowance allocation, we observe that i will hold
γi +
∑T
t=0 ϑ
i
t allowances at time T and hence its loss resulting from the potential
penalty payment at rate π (the penalty for the amount of emissions corresponding
to one allowance) is
π
[
T−1∑
t=0
(Eit − ξit − ϑit)− γi − ϑiT
]+
. (5)
5Finally, we define the space of feasible trading strategies ϑi = {ϑit}Tt=0 and abatement
strategies ξi = {ξit}T−1t=0 of agent i ∈ I as
U i := {(ϑi, ξi) : 0 ≤ ξit ≤ Eit , t = 0, . . . , T − 1}.
In view of (1), (4) and (5), the total revenue of agent i following an admissible policy
(ϑi, ξi) ∈ U i is equal to
LA,i(ϑi, ξi) := −
T−1∑
t=0
(ϑitAt + C
i(ξit))− ϑiTAT − π
[
T−1∑
t=0
(Eit − ξit − ϑit)− γi − ϑiT
]+
.
To specify risk preferences, we describe agents’ risk attitudes by individual utility
functions U i, i ∈ I, that are assumed to be continuous strictly increasing and concave.
For a random variable X , consider the utility functional
X 7→ ui(X) = E(U i(X)),
which is defined whenever the expectation exists and is not −∞. Given an allowance
price process A = {At}Tt=0, agent i behaves rationally in the sense that it maximizes
its utility from the terminal wealth
(ϑi, ξi) 7→ ui(LA,i(ϑi, ξi))
by an appropriate choice of the strategy that we denote by (ϑi∗, ξi∗). Following the
standard apprehension, a realistic market state is described by the so-called equilibrium
— a situation where the allowance price, positions and abatement measures are such
that each agent is satisfied with the own strategy and, at the same time, the natural
restrictions are met.
Definition 1. An adapted process A∗ = {A∗t}Tt=0 is called an equilibrium allowance
price process if, for each i ∈ I, there is a strategy (ϑ∗i, ξ∗i) ∈ U i such that we have
ui(LA
∗,i(ϑ∗i, ξ∗i)) <∞ and
(i) the cumulative changes in positions are in zero net supply:∑
i∈I
ϑ∗it = 0 for all t = 0, . . . , T ,
(ii) each agent i ∈ I is satisfied with its own strategy in the sense that, for each
(ϑi, ξi) ∈ U i such that ui (LA∗,i(ϑi, ξi)) exists, one has
ui
(
LA
∗,i(ϑ∗i, ξ∗i)
) ≥ ui (LA∗,i(ϑi, ξi)) .
6In [15], this equilibrium notion was used to establish a reduced-form model which
describes the allowance price evolution from the risk-neutral perspective. This ap-
proach utilizes the following three properties of the above equilibrium.
(a) There is no arbitrage since any profitable strategy would immediately be followed
by all agents.
(b) Given a technology with lower reduction costs than the present allowance price,
it is optimal to immediately reduce one’s pollution and take profit from selling
allowances.
(c) There are only two final outcomes for allowance price: at maturity, either the price
will vanish if there is an excess in allowances, or, in the case of their shortage,
the price will rise to the penalty level. Exact coincidences of allowance demand
and supply at maturity occur with zero probability under broad assumptions and
can be neglected.
The last property follows from the assumption that the random variable
∑
iE
i
T
representing the total emissions at maturity has a continuous distribution, given the
information up to time T −1. Under mild additional assumptions, [15] claims that the
above assertions can be deduced from the equilibrium in the following form.
Proposition 2.1. Suppose that {A∗t}Tt=0 is an equilibrium allowance price process and
{ξ∗it }T−1t=0 , i ∈ I, are corresponding equilibrium abatement strategies.
(a) There exists a measure Q on (Ω,F) which is equivalent to P and such that
{A∗t}Tt=0 is a Q-martingale.
(b) For each i ∈ I one has
ξ∗it = r
i
t(A
∗
t ), t = 0, . . . , T − 1, (6)
with the reduction functions rit, t = 0, . . . , T − 1, from (2).
(c) The terminal value of the allowance price is given by
A∗T = π1
(∑
i∈I
(
T−1∑
t=0
(Eit − ξ∗it )− γi
)
≥ 0
)
. (7)
where 1(B) is the indicator of the event B.
In fact, Proposition 2.1 states the above-mentioned feedback relationship. Namely,
the equilibrium allowance price process {A∗t}Tt=0 is a martingale under Q ∼ P that
has the terminal value (7). However, this terminal random variable depends on the
intermediate values {A∗t}T−1t=0 through (6). A surprising consequence of the feedback
7relationship is that, from the risk-neutral perspective, only the cumulative market
quantities are relevant. To see this, introduce the overall “business-as-usual” allowance
shortage by
ET =
∑
i∈I
(
T−1∑
t=0
Eit − γi
)
.
Further, recall from (3) the cumulative abatement function rt(a) to express the risk-
neutral certificate price dynamics using (6) (7) and the martingale property of {A∗t}Tt=0
under Q as
A∗t = πE
Q
[
1
(
ET −
T−1∑
t=0
rt(A
∗
t ) ≥ 0
) ∣∣∣Ft
]
, t = 0, . . . , T − 1.
Although the individual market attributes seem to be irrelevant here, the reader should
notice that this picture appears only from the risk-neutral viewpoint.
With this, the problem of risk neutral allowance price modeling boils down to the
following task:
Given a measure Q ∼ P and reduction functions
{rt}T−1t=0 , describe the random variable ET and
determine a Q-martingale {A∗t}Tt=0 such that
A∗T = π1
(
ET −
∑T−1
t=0 rt(A
∗
t ) ≥ 0
)
.
In this form, transition to the continuous time case is straightforward and the resulting
problem can be stated as follows:
Given a measure Q ∼ P and reduction functions
{rt}t∈[0,T ], describe the random variable ET and
determine a Q-martingale {A∗t}t∈[0,T ] such that
A∗T = π1
(
ET −
∫ T
0
rs(A
∗
s)ds ≥ 0
)
.
(8)
Problem (8) is the starting point of our investigation in this paper. This approach
utilizes the ingredients {rt}t∈[0,T ] and ET , which is reasonable from the practical per-
spective since the price-dependent reduction functions {rt}t∈[0,T ] can be estimated from
the market data and the potential allowance shortage ET can be modeled in terms of
emission fluctuations.
3 Continuous time case: diffusion models
Modeling in continuous time stipulates that the compliance period is an interval [0, T ]
and that all the relevant random evolutions are described by adapted stochastic pro-
cesses on a filtered probability space (Ω,F ,Q, {Ft}t∈[0,T ]) which is equipped with a
8“spot martingale” probability measure Q ∼ P. Given a random variable ET and ap-
propriate non-decreasing continuous abatement functions rt : R+ × Ω → R+ indexed
by t ∈ [0, T ], we want to find a solution {At}t∈[0,T ] to
At = πE
Q
[
1
(
ET −
∫ T
0
rs(As)ds ≥ 0
) ∣∣∣Ft
]
, t ∈ [0, T ]. (9)
The results of the discrete-time analysis given in [15] suggest that, if the increments
of the martingale
{Et := EQ(ET | Ft)}t∈[0,T ]
are independent and the abatement functions rt : R+ ×Ω→ R+ are deterministic and
time independent, then one can reasonably expect that a solution to (9) can have the
functional form
At = α(t, Xt), t ∈ [0, T ],
with an appropriate deterministic function
α : [0, T ]× R 7→ R (10)
and a state process {Xt}t∈[0,T ] given by
Xt := Et −
∫ t
0
rs(As)ds, t ∈ [0, T ]. (11)
In this section, we demonstrate how this approach enables one to find a solution in
the framework of diffusion processes. Assume that {Wt}t∈[0,T ] is a standard Brownian
motion process (under Q ∼ P) and that our {Ft}t∈[0,T ] is the natural filtration of the
process. In this case, by the martingale representation theorem [16], one must have
dEt = σtdWt
for some admissible adapted process {σt}t∈[0,T ]. To ensure that {Et}t∈[0,T ] has indepen-
dent increments, we assume that {σt = σ(t)}t∈[0,T ] is a known deterministic function
and that we are given continuous non-decreasing time-independent abatement func-
tions {rt = r}t∈[0,T ]. To verify the martingale property of the allowance price process
At = α(t, Xt), t ∈ [0, T ],
we use Itoˆ’s formula and (11) to write the stochastic differential of the process as
dAt = dα(t, Xt)
= ∂(1,0)α(t, Xt)dt+ ∂(0,1)α(t, Xt)dXt +
1
2
∂(0,2)α(t, Xt)d[E ]t
= ∂(1,0)α(t, Xt)dt− ∂(0,1)α(t, Xt)r(α(t, Xt))dt+ 1
2
∂(0,2)α(t, Xt)σ
2(t)dt
+ ∂(0,1)α(t, Xt)σ(t)dWt.
9Here [E ]t stands for the quadratic variation of the martingale {Et}t∈[0,T ] and ∂(i,j) de-
notes the respective partial derivatives. Now we observe that the function α is a
solution to
∂(1,0)α(t, x)− r(α(t, x))∂(0,1)α(t, x) + 1
2
σ2(t)∂(0,2)α(t, x) = 0 (12)
in (0, T )× R with the boundary condition
α(T, x) = π1(x > 0), x ∈ R, (13)
justified by the digital terminal allowance price, then the thus constructed {At}t∈[0,T ]
will indeed be a martingale that satisfies (9) by construction. Note that α(t, x) satisfies
the maximum principle, so that 0 6 α(t, x) 6 π for all (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]×R. For the proof
of this fact, see Proposition 4.1 below.
The following summarizes the above-presented approach.
Allowance price in the diffusion framework
1. Given a continuous non-decreasing function r : [0,∞) → [0,∞) and a positive
function σ(t), t ∈ [0, T ] × R, determine a solution α to the boundary value
problem (12), (13). (We assume that σ(t) is regular enough to ensure existence
and uniqueness of the solution.)
2. Verify that there is a unique strong solution to
dXt = dEt − r(α(t, Xt))dt, X0 = E0. (14)
3. Introduce the allowance price {At}t∈[0,T ] by
At := α(t, Xt), t ∈ [0, T ].
Having constructed the allowance price process {At}t∈[0,T ] in this way, one obtains
a standard procedure for the valuation of European options. Indeed, observe that,
due to the Markov property of the strong solution to (14), the fair time t price of a
European call option written on the allowance price at (maturity) date τ ∈ (t, T ] is
given in terms of an appropriate function of the state variable:
Ct = E
Q
[
(Aτ −K)+ | Ft
]
= EQ
[
(α(τ,Xτ)−K)+ | Ft
]
= f τ (t, Xt).
To ensure that {Ct = f τ (t, Xt)}t∈[0,τ ] is a martingale, the function f τ : [0, τ)× R→ R
is to be taken as a solution to the linear partial differential equation
∂(1,0)f
τ (t, x)− ∂(0,1)f τ(t, x)r(α(t, x)) + 1
2
∂(0,2)f
τ (t, x)σ2(t) = 0, (15)
10
in (0, τ)× R. However, the boundary condition in this case will be
f τ (τ, x) = (α(τ, x)−K)+, x ∈ R. (16)
Summarizing, we obtain the following description for the procedure.
Valuating a European call in the diffusion framework
1. Find the function α as above.
2. Given a strike price K ≥ 0 and maturity time τ ∈ [0, T ] of a European call,
calculate f τ as the solution to the boundary problem (15), (16).
3. Given a time t ∈ [0, τ ] and the allowance price a ∈ [0, π] at time t, obtain x as
the solution to α(t, x) = a.
4. Substitute t and the thus obtained x into the function f τ to obtain the time t
price of the European call as f τ (t, x).
Note that one can also estimate f τ directly using Monte Carlo simulations: given a
strike price K ≥ 0, a maturity time τ ∈ [0, T ] of a European call, a time t ∈ [0, τ ] and
the allowance price a ∈ [0, π] at time t, obtain Xt = x as the solution to α(t, x) = a.
Then, using the Markov property of {Xt}, one can evaluate the option price
Ct = E
Q
[
(α(τ,Xτ)−K)+ | Xt = x
]
by estimating the expectation via simulating a (large enough) number NMC of copies
of the random variable Xτ .
Note that closed-form solutions to the non-linear partial differential equation (12)
are rarely available. However, a linear abatement function leads to explicit expressions,
as pointed out in [25] and [31]. We will consider this case as an illustration.
Example. Given a linear abatement function r(a) = ca, c ∈ (0,∞), and a constant
diffusion coefficient {σt = σ}t∈[0,T ] with σ ∈ (0,∞), the partial differential equation
(12) becomes Burger’s equation
∂(1,0)u− cu∂(0,1)u+ σ
2
2
∂(0,2)u = 0, (17)
whose solution can be obtained from that of the heat equation via the Hopf-Cole
transform.
Namely, a direct calculation shows that if v : [0, T ]×R 7→ R solves the heat equation
∂(1,0)v +
σ2
2
∂(0,2)v = 0, (18)
11
then its Hopf-Cole transform
u := −σ
2
c
∂(0,1)v
v
(19)
solves (17). In order to satisfy an original boundary condition
u(T, x) ≡ −σ
2
c
∂(0,1)v(T, x)
v(T, x)
= b(x), x ∈ R,
the boundary value function for (18) must be chosen as
v(T, x) = b˜(x) := exp
{
− c
σ2
∫ x
−∞
b(u)du
}
, x ∈ R.
Our digital boundary condition has the form
u(T, x) = b(x) = π1(x > 0), x ∈ R,
so that we should take
v(T, x) = b˜(x) = 1(x < 0) + 1(x > 0)e−cpix/σ
2
, x ∈ R.
Denoting by N(µ, s2) the normal distribution with mean µ and variance s2 and by
Φ(y) and ϕ(y) = Φ′(y) the standard normal distribution function and its density,
respectively, we can write:
v(t, x) =
∫
b˜(y)N(x, σ2(T − t))(dy)
=
∫ 0
−∞
N(x, σ2(T − t))(dy) +
∫ ∞
0
e−cpiy/σ
2
N(x, σ2(T − t))(dy)
= Φ
( −x
σ
√
T − t
)
+ Φ
(
x− cπ(T − t)
σ
√
T − t
)
exp
{
−cπ
σ2
x+
π2c2(T − t)
2σ2
}
. (20)
The derivative of this expression with respect to x is equal to
∂(0,1)v(t, x) = −
ϕ
(
−x
σ
√
T−t
)
σ
√
T − t +
ϕ
(
x−cpi(T−t)
σ
√
T−t
)
σ
√
T − t exp
{
−cπ
σ2
x+
π2c2(T − t)
2σ2
}
− cπ
σ2
Φ
(
x− cπ(T − t)
σ
√
T − t
)
exp
{
−cπ
σ2
x+
π2c2(T − t)
2σ2
}
. (21)
Next we use (19) to calculate
α(t, x) = −σ
2
c
∂(0,1)v(t, x)
v(t, x)
, (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]× R. (22)
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Figure 1: The functions α(t, ·) displayed for t = 1.9, 1.6, 1.3, 1.0, 0.7, 0.4 and calculated
using (20)–(22) with T = 2, σ = 4, c = 0.02 and π = 100.
The shape of this function is depicted in Figure 1.
To illustrate our valuation procedure, consider the following parameters: time to
compliance date T = 2, diffusion coefficient σ = 4, penalty π = 100 and a linear
abatement function r(a) = ca with c = 0.02. Taking t = 0, we consider a family of
European calls with the same strike price K = 25, but different maturity times τ .
Suppose that the initial allowance price is equal to the strike price a = A0 = 25 (the
so-called at-the-money situation), which is attained by α(0, x) = 25 with x ≈ −2.434.
Next, we determine the call prices C(0, τ) at time t = 0 for different maturity times
τ ∈ [0, T ]. Independently of the model, the price of an expiring call with τ = 0 must
be equal to zero, whereas the longest-maturity call with τ = T must have the price
A0(π − K)/π = 25 × 0.75 = 18.75. (Note that, because of the digital payoff, such a
call is equivalent to 0.75 allowances). That is, the call prices increase with contract’s
maturity from 0 to 18.75. The shape of this curve is obtained using a crude Monte
Carlo procedure. We have simulated NMC = 10
4 i.i.d. copies of the random variable
Xτ . We used the forward Euler method to generate i.i.d. copies of {Xt}, with time
step 0.02. The curve is presented in Figure 2, together with 95% confidence intervals.
4 Allowance price in the jump-diffusion setting
In this section, we describe a situation where the market can suddenly change due to
the presence of jumps. We propose a framework suitable to the present practice of the
EU ETS where the member states negotiate their allowance allocations and the market
needs to adapt to the new situation. For instance, revised decision on the amount of
allocated certificates yields a jump of allowance market prices. Also, a sudden change
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Figure 2: The prices of European calls depending on their maturity times.
in demand and/or price for fuel can result in the pollution levels changing dramatically
which impacts on the allowance prices.
We discuss how to solve problem (8) in the jump-diffusion setting using a similar
approach to the one employed in Section 3. Namely, we choose a candidate for (9) of
the form
At = α(t, Xt),
where α and Xt are as in (10) and (11), respectively. But now we assume that the
martingale
Et := EQ [ET | Ft] , t ∈ [0, T ]
is modeled using a general jump-diffusion process adapted to a filtration {Ft}t∈[0,T ].
In this setting, the process {Xt}t∈[0,T ] is given by the following stochastic differential
equation:
dXt = −r(α(t, Xt))dt+ σ(t, Xt)dWt +
∫
R0
a(t−, Xt−, y)(pν − qν)(dy × dt), (23)
where R0 = R \ {0}, {Wt}t∈[0,T ] is a Brownian motion adapted to the filtration
{Ft}t∈[0,T ], and pν is an independent of {Wt}t∈[0,T ] {Ft}t∈[0,T ]-adapted random Pois-
son measure with intensity qν(dy × dt) = λν(dy)dt, ν being a probability distribution
on R and λ ∈ (0,∞) a positive constant. Expression (23) allows us to model jumps
with great flexibility, as the distribution of the jump is state and time dependent. It is
known that, under suitable Lipschitz and growth conditions on r, σ and a, stochastic
differential equation (23) possesses a unique strong solution [14].
We again use Itoˆ’s lemma for At = α(t, Xt) to find conditions on α under which
the process {At}t∈[0,T ] will be a martingale under Q. Let τ = T − t. For convenience,
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we introduce a new function β(τ, x) = α(T − τ, x) and, instead of (12), obtain the
following nonlinear partial integro-differential equation for β:
∂(1,0)β(τ, x) = −r(β(τ, x))∂(0,1)β(τ, x) + 1
2
σ2(τ, x)∂(0,2)β(τ, x)
+λ
∫ [
β(τ, x+ a(τ, x, y))− β(τ, x)− a(τ, x, y)∂(0,1)β(τ, x)
]
ν(dy), (24)
(τ, x) ∈ [0, T ]× R, with the boundary condition
β(0, x) = π1(x > 0), x ∈ R. (25)
Under certain assumptions, jump-diffusion models for option pricing lead to partial
integro-differential equations, see e.g. [1, 9]. Equation (24) differs from them in that it
has a nonlinear coefficient r(β(τ, x)). We assume that there exists a classical solution
β ∈ C1,2([0, T )×R) to the problem (24), (25). It is not difficult to see that it satisfies
the maximum principle.
Proposition 4.1. Solution β(τ, x) to equation (24) with initial boundary condition
β(0, x) = h(x) satisfies the maximum principle:
inf
z
h(z) 6 β(τ, x) 6 sup
z
h(z), (τ, x) ∈ [0, T ]× R. (26)
Proof. Since with α(t, x) = β(T−t, x), where β satisfies (24), the process At = α(t, Xt)
is a Q-martingale. Also, the process {Xt} given by (23) is a Markov process. Thus,
one has a.s.
α(t, Xt) = E(AT | Ft) = E(α(T,XT ) | Ft) = E(α(T,XT ) | Xt)
and so, due to regularity of α, for τ = T − t,
β(τ, x) = α(t, x) = E(α(T,XT ) | Xt = x)
= E(β(0, XT ) | Xt = x) = E(h(XT ) | Xt = x),
which immediately implies (26).
Note that Proposition 4.1 also proves the maximum principle for solution to the
boundary value problem (12), (13).
We will see that, under a mild condition, the maximum principle remains valid for
the discretized problem as well (see Proposition 4.2 below).
Analytical solution to partial integro-differential equations can only be obtained in
a few special cases, so in most situations one can only solve them numerically. In this
section, we discuss a discretization of (24) using the finite difference method and prove
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that the discretized equation has a unique solution. Finally, we illustrate the approach
by providing a numerical example.
First we need to truncate the domain of x. Let Dl := {x ∈ R : |x| < l}, where the
bound l > 0 of the domain can be chosen so that the probability that the process {Xt}
leaves Dl during the time interval [0, T ] given it starts at X0 does not exceed a given
small ǫ > 0. This procedure will be illustrated at the end of the section.
Next, we restrict the domain of integration for the integral term on the RHS of
(24) to an interval [K1, K2], chosen such that the error made due to the truncation
also remains small. For a good choice of the terminals Kj, one can refer to the study
presented in [3].
The numerical solution will be computed on a discrete grid. Let N denote the total
number of discrete x-values and M the total number of τ -values we want to use in
the grid for the numerical solution, so that the step sizes in x and τ are respectively
∆x = 2l/N and ∆τ = T/M . Put xi = −l+ i∆x, τn = n∆τ , for i ∈ Z and n = 0, . . . ,M .
We use βni = β(τn, xi) for the values of β on this grid. Because of the presence
of the non local term on the RHS of equation (24), one needs to define β outside
[0, T ]×Dl. We chose the simplest and most intuitive approach and set βni := g(xi) for
i /∈ {0, . . . , N − 1}, where
g(x) :=
{
π if x > l,
0 if x 6 −l.
The partial derivatives are replaced by the respective finite differences:
∂(1,0)β(τn, xi) ≈ β
n+1
i − βni
∆τ
,
∂(0,1)β(τn, xi) ≈ β
n
i − βni−1
∆x
,
∂(1,0)β(τn, xi) ≈
βni+1 − 2βni + βni−1
(∆x)2
.
Following an approach similar to the one used in [10], we consider the same step size
∆x to approximate the integral term, and choose J1 and J2 such that [K1, K2] ⊆
[(J1 − 1/2)∆x, (J2 + 1/2)∆x], which leads to the approximation
λ
∫
R0
β(τn, xi + a(τn, xi, y))ν(dy) ≈ λ
J2∑
j=J1
νjβ
n
j∗(i,j,n)
where
νj :=
(j+1/2)∆x∫
(j−1/2)∆x
ν(dy)
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and
j∗(i, j, n) := arg min
k
|(xi + a(τn, xi, xj))− (k∆x − l)|.
Similarly, one has
∂(0,1)β(τn, xi)
K2∫
K1
a(τn, xi, y)ν(dy) ≈ β
n
i − βni−1
∆x
J2∑
j=J1
ani,jνj ,
where ani,j := a(τn, xi, xj). We set Σ
n
i :=
J2∑
j=J1
ani,jνj for convenience.
So now we are looking for a solution {βni } on the grid such that, for n = 0, . . . ,M−1,
βn+1i − βni
∆τ
=
1
2
σ2(τn+1, xi)
βn+1i+1 − 2βn+1i + βn+1i−1
(∆x)2
− r(βni )
βn+1i − βn+1i−1
∆x
+ λ
Jr∑
j=Jl
νjβ
n
j∗(i,j,n) − λβn+1i − λ
βn+1i − βn+1i−1
∆x
Σn+1i (27)
with
β0i = π1(xi > 0) for i ∈ Z, βni = g(xi) for i < 0 and i ≥ N .
Let Σ∗ := minΣni and σ
∗2 := min σ2(τn, xi), where the minima are taken over all
i ∈ {0, . . . , N − 1} and n ∈ {0, . . . ,M}.
Proposition 4.2. The discretized problem has a unique solution {βni }. If, in addition,
σ2 is bounded away from zero and the discrete grid is such that
−Σ∗∆x 6 σ
∗2
2λ
,
then the solution satisfies the maximum principle:
0 6 βni 6 π for any i ∈ Z and n ∈ {0, . . . ,M − 1},
where π is the penalty per unit of pollutant not covered by the initial allocation.
This proposition ensures that the discretized problem is well posed. In particular,
it shows that the allowance price process is always positive and does not exceed the
level of penalty fixed by the regulator at any time during the compliance period.
Proof. We follow the steps in the proof from [10]. For n ∈ {0, . . . ,M − 1} and i ∈
{0, . . . , N − 1}, equation (27) can be rewritten as
−F (βni )∆τβn+1i−1 + (1 +Gni (βni )∆τ )βn+1i −Hni ∆τβn+1i+1 (28)
= βni + λ∆τ
Jr∑
j=Jl
νjβ
n
j∗(i,j,n),
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where
F ni (β
n
i ) =
σ2(τn+1, xi)
2(∆x)2
+
r(βni )
∆x
+
λΣn+1i
∆x
, (29)
Gni (β
n
i ) =
σ2(τn+1, xi)
(∆x)2
+
r(βni )
∆x
+
λΣn+1i
∆x
+ λ, (30)
Hni =
σ2(τn+1, xi)
2(∆x)2
. (31)
This is a linear system and can be written as
M(n)βn+1 = yn for all n = 0, . . . ,M − 1, (32)
where βn+1 = (βn+10 , . . . , β
n+1
N−1) ∈ RN , yn = (yn0 , . . . , ynN−1) ∈ RN with components
yni = β
n
i + λ∆τ
Jr∑
j=Jl
νjβ
n
j∗(i,j,n), i = 0, . . . , N − 2
and
ynN−1 = β
n
N−1 + λ∆τ
Jr∑
j=Jl
νjβ
n
j∗(N−1,j,n) +H
n
N−1∆τπ
given by the right hand side of (28). Given βn, the matrixM(n) ∈ RN×N is tridiagonal:
the elements on its main diagonal are the terms (1+Gni (β
n
i )∆τ ), the elements of the fist
diagonal above it are given by −Hni ∆τ and the elements of the fist diagonal below the
main diagonal are given by −F ni (βni )∆τ . Furthermore, M(n) is diagonally dominant,
which can be seen from the relation
Gni (β
n
i ) = F
n
i (β
n
i ) +H
n
i + λ for i = 0, . . . , N − 1 and n = 0, . . .M
and the non-negativity of the coefficients (29)–(31). Therefore, given βn, the linear sys-
tem (32) possesses a unique solution βn+1, see [18]. Hence the existence and uniqueness
of the solution to (27) follows by induction.
Now we will use induction in n to show that the maximum principle holds. We will
only prove that βni are non-negative, as the argument can be easily adapted to prove
that the values βni remain bounded by π.
We want to show that, for any ∆τ > 0 and ∆x > 0,
βni > 0 for all i ∈ Z and n ∈ {0, . . . ,M − 1}.
For n = 0, this is obvious from the shape of the boundary condition (25) and the
definition of g. For induction step, assume that βni > 0 for all i ∈ Z, but there exists
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an i0 ∈ Z such that βn+1i0 < 0. By definition of g, i0 ∈ {0, . . . , N − 1} since we would
have βn+1i0 = g(xi0) > 0 otherwise. One can choose i0 such that
βn+1i0 = mini∈{0,...,N−1}
βn+1i < 0.
Under assumption (4.2), F ni , G
n
i and H
n
i are all non-negative. It follows from G
n
i (β
n
i ) =
F ni (β
n
i ) +H
n
i + λ that
βn+1i0 = −F ni (βni0)∆τβn+1i0 + (1 +Gni (βni0)∆τ )βn+1i0 −Hni ∆τβn+1i0 − λ∆τβn+1i0
> −F ni (βni0)∆τβn+1i0−1 + (1 +Gni (βni0)∆τ )βn+1i0 −Hni ∆τβn+1i0+1
= βni0 + λ∆τ
Jr∑
j=Jl
νjβ
n
j∗(i0,j,n)
> 0,
which is a contradiction. The proposition is proved.
In conclusion of this section, we give a method for choosing the domain boundary l
and provide a numerical illustration. Let us focus on a special case where a(τ, x, y) = y
holds for all y ∈ R, which corresponds to a compensated compound Poisson process.
Under this assumption, {Xt}t∈[0,T ] follows a jump-diffusion process given by
Xt = X0 −
∫ t
0
r(α(s,Xs))ds+
∫ t
0
σ(s,Xs)dWs +
Nt∑
j=1
Yi − λE(Y1)t,
where {Nt}t∈[0,∞[ stands for a Poisson process with intensity λ and {Yi}i∈N is a sequence
of independent identically distributed random variables following the same ν = N(0, 1),
all the components {Wt}, {Nt} and {Yi} of the model being independent of each other.
Denote the compensated jump component by
Jt :=
Nt∑
j=1
Yi − λE(Y1)t =
Nt∑
j=1
Yi
and the martingale part by Mt :=
∫ t
0
σ(s,Xs)dWs + Jt. Suppose for simplicity that
X0 = 0.
The reduction function r is non-decreasing and the non-negative function α(·, ·) is
bounded by π since it satisfies the maximum principle. Thus, for the drift term we
have
0 6
∫ t
0
r(α(s,Xs))ds 6 r(π)t. (33)
Next, we will use Kolmogorov-Doob inequality to bound the martingale part of {Xt},
for which we need a bound for the second moment of Mt. Observe that the covariance
between the diffusion and jump terms is given by
E
(
Jt
∫ t
0
σ(s,Xs)dWs
)
= E
[
JtE
(∫ t
0
σ(s,Xs)dWs
∣∣∣{Tj, Yj}
)]
, (34)
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where Tj is the time of the j-th jump Yj. Considering the inner expectation given
{Tj = tj , Yj = yj}, one can easily see that it is equal to zero, and hence the expected
value (34) is zero as well. It follows that
EM2t = E
(∫ t
0
σ(s,Xs)dWs
)2
+ EJ2t .
Clearly E(J2t ) = λEY
2
1 t. Next, assume that σ satisfies the standard linear growth
condition
σ2(s, x) 6 a + bx2, a, b > 0, x ∈ R.
Then
E
(∫ t
0
σ(s,Xs)dWs
)2
=
∫ t
0
Eσ2(s,Xs)ds 6
∫ t
0
E
(
a+ bX2s
)
ds
= at+ b
∫ t
0
EX2s ds,
and so we have
EM2t 6 λEY
2
1 t+ at + b
∫ t
0
EX2s ds.
Since we see from (33) that
Mt − r(π)t 6 Xt 6 Mt (35)
and EMt = 0, one has
EX2t 6 r
2(π)t2 + EM2t 6 (λEY
2
1 + a)t + r
2(π)t2 + b
∫ t
0
EX2sds.
Hence Gronwall’s lemma (see (2.10) and (2.11), Chapter 5 in [16]) applied to {Xt}
provides the upper bound
EX2t 6
1
b
(
a+ λEY 21 +
2r2(π)
b
)
ebt − 1
b
(
a+ λEY 21 + 2r
2(π)t+
2r2(π)
b
)
=: κt. (36)
The Kolmogorov-Doob inequality applied to the submartingale {−Xt} together with
(36) yields
P
(
inf
06t6T
Xt 6 −l
)
= P
(
sup
06t6T
(−Xt) > l
)
6 κT l
−2 =: ǫ1
for all l > 0. Noting that
EM2t 6 κt + r
2(π)t2 =: ζt,
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Figure 4: A typical path of the jump-diffusion process {Xt}t∈[0,T ].
one obtains similarly from the right inequality in (35) that
P
(
sup
06t6T
Xt > l
)
6 P
(
sup
06t6T
Mt > l
)
6 ζT l
−2 =: ǫ2,
which provides a way to determine the domain of truncation [−l, l] for our problem for
given accuracy levels ǫ1, ǫ2.
Suppose that the time unit is one year and assume that the time to compliance
is T = 1. Set the penalty level at π = 1 and take for simplicity a constant function
σ(t, x) ≡ σ in the diffusion term. We consider σ = 1 here. The compound Poisson
process is realized with intensity rate λ = 1 and a standard normal jump distribution
ν = N(0, 1). Finally, we suppose that the cumulative reduction function r is linear:
r(a) = a for all a ∈ [0, π]. In this case, for ǫ1 = ǫ2 = 0.05, we obtain the domain
truncation boundary l ≈ 11.
We consider a sequence of discretization schemes with the time step ∆t = 0.02
which gives M = 50 time points on the grid. Choosing the same space discretization
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∆x = 0.02, we obtain N = 2l/0.02 = 100l space points, depending on the truncation
[−l, l] of the space region. To control the error made by the truncation, the L1-norm
of the difference between two solutions βni (l), β
n
i (l˜) corresponding to the truncations
at levels ±l and ±l˜, respectively, is considered:
∑
i
M∑
n=0
|βni (l)− βni (l˜)|, l < l˜,
where the summation is taken over all grid points on a fixed sub-region [0, T ]× [−d, d]
with d < l < l˜. Numerical experiments show that, for d = 11 and l = 20, l˜ = 30,
the error is of order 10−7. We therefore conclude that the solution {βni }i,n calculated
for the space region [−30, 30] is accurate. Figure 3 shows the shape of the function
α obtained in this way. The graph in Figure 4 depicts a typical realization of the
process {Xt}t∈[0,T ], calculated using the forward Euler method [17]. Figure 5 shows the
corresponding realization of the price process {At = α(t, Xt)}t∈[0,T ].
Figure 6 displays the function α at time t = 0.8 obtained for various volatility levels
σ and jump rates λ. It turns out that, when the volatility is small, the price process
tends faster to its boundary value: agents do not expect big changes in pollution emis-
sions and therefore in the allowance price. If there is a shortage (excess) in allowance
credits before maturity, the market expects that there will also be a shortage (excess)
at t = T . In the presence of jumps or a large diffusion coefficient, the allowance price
tends to converge slower as one can expect a sudden increase or decrease in pollution
emissions which impacts directly on the allowance price.
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5 Conclusions
The growing evidence of the cost of climate change justifies the introduction of large-
scale measures. Emission trading schemes become increasingly important. The pro-
posed operation of newly designed cap-and-trade mechanisms within a multi-period
setting and with inter-connection to other markets adds a notable complexity to such
systems, and so quantitative understanding of emission trading schemes becomes in-
creasingly challenging. For instance, the problems of market design, the emission reduc-
tion performance, the optimization of allowance allocation procedures, the individual
risk management and the valuation of emission-related financial instruments need to be
addressed within a sound mathematical framework, which we aim to approach in this
work. Based on results from equilibrium analysis, we focus on the simplest situation
of a one-period market to show how the risk-neutral evolution of emission allowances
can be described in terms of jump-diffusion processes. Although the resulting partial
integro differential equations are non-linear, we provide numerically stable and fast val-
uation procedures which yield reliable numerical schemes for valuation of derivatives
of the fast-growing family of emission-related financial assets.
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